Legal Guideposts for Trade Associations by Witherspoon, Gibson
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 33 Number 2 Article 3 
1957 
Legal Guideposts for Trade Associations 
Gibson Witherspoon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Witherspoon, Gibson (1957) "Legal Guideposts for Trade Associations," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 33 
: No. 2 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol33/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
LEGAL GUIDEPOSTS FOR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS*
GIBSON WITHERSPOON"
In today's complex business world the average business needs a
trade association. Usually the smaller businesses need an associa-
tion more than the giant corporations, who have their own research
staff, their own credit department and cost accounting which shows
the exact cost of the smallest article. Various definitions have been
given for the modern trade association:
1. Probably one of the shortest and best definitions was advanced
by Herbert Hoover. "A trade association is a facility for the promo-
tion and self-regulation of industry and commerce."
2. Justice Louis D. Brandeis of our Supreme Court defined it: "A
trade association is an organization for mutual benefit, which sub-
stitutes knowledge for ignorance, rumor, guess and suspicion. It
tends to substitute research and reasoning for gambling and piracy,
without closing the door to adventure or lessening the value of
prophetic wisdom."
3. An association for political, commercial, or manufacturing pur-
poses, or even for those for science and literature is a powerful en-
lightened member of the community, which cannot be disposed of
at pleasure or oppressed without remonstrance, and which by de-
fending its own right against the encroachment of the government
saves the common liberties of all the country.1
Modern trade associations have become such an important unit in
our modern day business that almost all public-spirited citizens,
whether professional or businessmen, recognize that it must be fos-
tered and protected. Such associations are essentially democratic
in their organization - like the U. S. Senate. Small and large com-
panies have equal representation. Knowledge is exchanged. There
are neither religious or educational barriers to membership. Usual-
ly the sole qualification is engagement in industry of a profession.
Probably democracy in its purest sense is found today in trade asso-
ciations. Contrary to criticism, trade associations generally tend to
0 Paper delivered November 20, 1956 to the Workshop for Mississippi Association
Executives, Jackson, Mississippi; sponsored by the Mississippi Economic Council.
00 Member of the firm Witherspoon & Compton, Meridian, Mississippi. Member of the
Mississippi and United States Supreme Court Bars. Associate Editor of the COMMERCIAL
LAW JOURNAL. Director of the American Judicature Society. Commissioner from Mis-
sissippi to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Member of
the House of Delegates American Bar Association. Fellow, American Bar Association.
1. 11 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 319.
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serve their smaller members to a greater degree than their larger
ones..
2
WE CAN ALL AGREE ON SIX BASIC FUNDAMENTALS:
1. Trade associations are a most constructive force in our mod-
ern business and should therefore be preserved.
2. Under ordinary circumstances, advertising, promotion, re-
search, apprentice training, lobbying present no anti-trust
problems.
3. When illegal activities are engaged in, as price fixing, alloca-
tion of production, division of markets and boycotts, the trade
association has lost its usefulness and will eventually be vigor-
ously prosecuted.
3
4. Trade associations should not be a target for any extra sus-
picion and should be neither the darlings or the doughboys
of either the enforcement agencies or the courts.4
5. Members should keep informed of the activities of the trade
associations because judicial opinions deny the existence of
guilt by being just a member but they do appear to impose on
members a burden of keeping informed which may be impos-
sible to discharge.'
6. When it is learned or suspected that a trade association at-
tempts either to regulate or control the following it is time to
resign:
(a) What or how much 7 anyone can manufacture, buy or
sell.
(b) The prices at which its members buy or sell.s
(c) Who shall manufacture, buy or sell; 9 or
(d) Where anyone shall manufacture, buy or sell.1°
2. Guidepost to a Revised National Anti-Trust Policy, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139, 1172
(1952).
3. Mundt, The New Look Along the Potomac, 5 Journal of American Trade Associa-
tion Executives (April, 1953).
4. Carretta, Legality of Trade Associations, Address to the New York Bar Ass'n.
(March 25, 1954).
5. Phelps, Dodge Refining Co. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1943) (The court
there held, "[W]e are not prepared to hold that mere membership is enough to show
complicity. ... but after a member knows or "is chargeable with the knowledge that
his fellows are acting unlawfully" he may be charged with participation in an illegal
conspiracy.) (emphasis supplied). But see FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948)
(The court held membership in the institute justified the commissioner's finding against
each member.).
6. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Milk & I. C. C.
Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 4,78 (7th Cir. 1946).
7. United States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701 (S.D. N. Y.
1908).
8. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
9. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914).
10. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
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Our purpose is to help the proper trade association, which is do-
ing much for industry and commerce without running afoul with
the law. Fundamentally if the wholesaler, retailer and the con-
sumer deal with each other on an individual basis, each as an abso-
lute free agent, then the greatest economic good for all has been
accomplished and the law has not been violated. In 1890 this philo-
sophy of economic "individualism" was first codified in the Sherman
Act."t Basically the Act declares illegal a "combination" or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade. As trade associations are not an
iudividual but a group working together in a common cause, it is
therefore a "combination" and many times a combination of com-
petitors. So if a trade association does anything in restraint of trade
such acts are illegal. Fortunately our courts construe this vague
phase and enunciate what is and what is not "restraint of trade."
Of course, no member can deny membership especially where
membership in a particular association has any business signifi-
cance. 12 Our Supreme Court held by-laws illegal which effectively
prevented newspapers which competed with AP members from
joining the Associated Press and held:
"The Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit inde-
pendent businesses from becoming 'associates' in a common
plan which is bound to reduce their competitors' opportunity to
buy or sell the things in which the groups compete. Victory of
a member of such a combination over its business rivals achiev-
ed by such collective means cannot consistently with the Sher-
man Act or with practical, everyday knowledge be attributed
to individual 'enterprise or sagacity'; such hampering of busi-
ness rivals can only be attributed to that which really makes it
possible-the collective power of an individual combination."'"
As modern business expands, this basic economic philosophy of
individualism has been limited, defined or expanded in the Clayton
Act,' 4 Robinson-Patman Act, 1 Norris-La Guardia Act and Webb-
Pomerine Act,"' Miller-Tydings and McGuire Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act.17 The two prime anti-trust laws are the
Sherman Act and its handmaiden, the Federal Trade Commission
11. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
12. American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950);Quality Bakers v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimi-
nation Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
13. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, (1945).
14. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952) (affects the way a buyer may
deal with a seller). See Quality Bakers v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940).
15. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S.C. § 13 (1952) (This act is really an amendment
to the Clayton Act.).
16. This act deals with Export Associations and provides for anti-trust exemptions.
17. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S. C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
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Act, and they are applied today to prevent group interference with
free operation of the marketing or merchandising process.
The Federal Trade Commission Act declares "UNFAIR METH-
ODS OF COMPETITION * * * UNLAWFUL." This presents an-
other indefinite phrase and makes it very difficult to provide busi-
iessmen with specific rules of conduct but the Act has provided the
courts a catch-all legal prohibition for previously uncatalogued
actions by associations, which interfere with the fundamental con-
cept of individualism in modern marketing processes. As the Su-
preme Court has held that unfair methods of competition although
not a precise definition "but the meaning and application of which
must be arrived at" by what this Court elsewhere has called "the
gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."' It would seem
the major purpose of this Act is to enable the commission to restrain
certain practices as "unfair" which, although not yet a violation of
the Sherman Act would most likely do so if left unrestrained. Thus
individual conduct or concerted conduct of an association may fall
short of being a violation of the Sherman Act but come within the
spirit of "unfair method of competition" under the Trade Commis-
sion Act and be illegal.19
A. What Activities Are Legal Under the Sherman Act
(prohibiting a conspiracy or combination IN RESTRAINT OF
TRADE) and the Federal Trade Commission Act (which declares
unlawful, unfair methods of competition)?
Many types of activities are relatively safe for a trade association
fundamentally because they are not directly related to merchan-
dising aspect of business. Some of these have been listed as fol-
Jcws: 20
1. Safety and Accident Prevention Programs. These have proved
immensely valuable in industries where the raw materials, manu-
facturing process, or machinery used are inherently dangerous.
Joint industry collection and dissemination of accident causes and
industry-wide prizes and awards to plants or companies with im-
proved safety records have been proven far more effective than in-
dividual company efforts.
2. Health Program. In industries which deal with new materials
inherently dangerous to health, association sponsored research as
18. FTC v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 683 (1934).
19. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
20. Ruddock, The Organization and Activities of Trade Associations, A. T. A. Journal
46 (July, 1955).
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to causes and cures have proved very effective. In dealing with
Workmen's Compensation authorities, the report on disease-caus-
ing potential of a substance by an industry-wide trade association
carries far more weight than any individual company report.
3. Product Publicity. An association can finance an excellent
publicity program for the basic products of the industry without
undue expense to any one company. Furthermore, because the pub-
licity emenates from an industry-wide association, it commands a
far greater acceptance by editors than would any individual com-
pany's publicity release. An association publicity program has
proved very valuable (a) in overcoming historical public resistance
to a type of product; (b) in introducing a new product which per-
forms a function similar to an older product and thus must struggle
for public acceptance; (c) in extolling some fundamental charac-
teristics of the basic products of an industry which make them pre-
ferable to the products of a different industry which are sold to per-
form the same function; and (d) in combatting an adverse de-
velopment which has imperiled the public's previous acceptance of
the product.
4. Research. An association research program, financed by the
contributions of all members, can accomplish much that would only
be attempted by the largest companies alone. It can serve to de-
velop new products and new uses for existing products, to investi-
gate cause of product defects and improve the product, to develop
better production methods, and to discover commercial uses for
waste or by-products.
5. Cooperation With Government Agencies. Trade associations
have proved invaluable to government departments and agencies in
peace time and war time. In peace time the collection of industry
statistics for the Department of Commerce, the working out of
product specifications with all government purchasing agencies and
the development of specification standards with the Bureau of
Standards have proved of great assistance to the efficient operation
of government. In most cases it would be a practical impossibility
for the government agency concerned to work with each company
individually. In tariff matters, I. C. C. freight rate hearings, and
the Federal Trade Commission trade practice conferences, a re-
sponsible industry trade association is almost a necessity if a comp-
rehensive picture of the effect of proposed official action on an in-
dustry is to be measured accurately. In war time the government
agencies administering manpower, raw material and price controls
[VOL. 33
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found trade associations valuable in supplying background facts
and quickly assembling a cross-section of industry leaders. Un-
fortunately here, however, the latent suspicion of trade associations
led to the utterly unnecessary barring of trade association execu-
tives from participation in the work of Industry Advisory Commit-
tees. However, trade association actions in co-operation with gov-
ernment agencies are almost always legally safe. One notable ex-
ception to the generality of this statement is the attitude of the
courts to the manner in which railroads have combined in propos-
ing freight rates to the Inter-state Commerce Commission."
2
'
1
6. Assemblying General Information. For example, the U. S.
Chamber of Commerce just released a report22 which showed
fringe benefits paid by one thousand selected American companies
averaged $810.00 per employes in 1955. Such benefits, including
pensions, insurance, vacations, holidays and payments required by
law have increased an average of $100.00 since 1953. We see that
"weekly wage and hourly rates are no longer accurate measures of
either workers income or the labor costs of doing business." There
are many other legitimate services rendered by trade associations
which are too numerous and too well known to mention here.
7. Public Relations and Legislative Activities. Trade associ-
ations habitually represent the industry in public relations pro-
grams, institutional advertising, etc. Certainly your association is
not likely to run afoul of the anti-trust laws in programs designed
to foster good will, introduce new industry products and uses;
solicit and hold customers and to support and defend the industry.
Another one of the most common products of association activi-
ties is the inevitable resolution favoring or condemning pending or
proposed legislation. Executives should remember, however,
(a) That corporate members are prohibited under state and fed-
eral laws from contributing to specified political activities.
(b) Corporate contributions for the promotion or defeat of leg-
islation are not deductible as a general business expense.2 3
(c) If your trade association charter purposes and specific activi-
ties fall within the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, strict com-
pliance must be maintained.
8. Defense of Law Suits Against Any Member of Industry.
21. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Ry., 324 U. S. 439 (1945); United States v. Association
of American Railroads, 4 F. R. D. 510 (1945).
22. Fringe Benefits of 1955, prepared by Dr. Emerson P. Schmidt, Director of Eco-
nomic Research, United States Chamber of Commerce.
23. Internal Revenue v. Textile Mills Security Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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Where a law suit effects the entire industry, many trade associa-
tions have raised a common defense fund and employed one set of
counsel who specialize in this type of litigation. This is in addition
to insurance carried for the general protection of all members of the
industry. Several years ago there were many cases against the
cement companies for silicosis symptoms and diseases of the respi-
ratory system. Today the tobacco industries have employed a New
York firm to supervise and handle all litigation against any member
of their association where it is alleged smoking caused cancer.."2 4
B. What Activities Are Illegal for Trade Associations?
Under the concept of restraint of trade and unfair methods of
competition, a trade association cannot legally:
(1) Set minimum prices, establish prices, fix price differential or
enforce maintenance of resale prices.
As early as 1927 Justice Stone said: "The aim and result of every
price fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of
competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised
or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary
and unreasonable prices."5 Thus, a price arbitrarily fixed today as
reasonable may be very unreasonable tomorrow because of eco-
nomic or business conditions. "Any combination which tampers with
price structure is engaged in an unlawful activity; under the Sher-
man Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."26
Agreements either expressed or implied and trade associations
activities that have any "manipulation" of price as their goal should
never be undertaken on the theory that they do not constitute price
fixing or in the belief that an anti-trust violation will be excused be-
cause the association represents but a small part of the industry or
that its members cannot effectively control prices in their market.
(2) Allocate the market, either geographically or by classes of
customers.
Not only is price fixing declared to be illegal per se but the allo-
cating of the market either geographically or by classes of cus-
tomers has been held to be illegal and an unlawful combination.17
The anti-trust statutes themselves are expressed in very general and
24. Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
25. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
26. United States v. Soeony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
27. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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indefinite terms and this prohibition was probably motivated in
part, at least, by a desire on the part of government officials to shape
the business economy according to their own ideas.
(3) Limit the supply of product reaching the market.
This practice is inherently anti-competitive and should be avoid-
ed entirely, whether it is a per se offense is debatable but certainly
the practice has been condemned and declared to be illegal.28
(4) Boycotts, blacklists, prevent any buyer or class of buyers
from having access to all the present or potential products of the
Industry.
In 1914 in the first major trade association case 29 a boycott was
challenged directly, that is apart from allegations of price fixing
and other illegal activities. Some wholesale lumber dealers were
selling direct to consumers. So the retailers got together, compiled
and circulated names of all offending wholesalers, although there
was no agreement that those wholesalers whose names appeared on
the list should be boycotted, but the court said: ". . . the circulation
of such information among the hundreds of retailers had and was
intended to have the mutual effect of causing such retailers to with-
hold their patronage from the concerns listed. A retail dealer has
the unquestioned right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for
reasons sufficient to himself and may so do because he thinks such
dealer is acting unfairly in trying to undermine his trade . . . But
when a retailer goes beyond his personal right and conspiring and
combining with others of like purpose, seeks to obtain the free
course of interstate trade and commerce and to unduly suppress
competition by placing obnoxious wholesale dealers under coercive
influence of a condemnatory report, he exceeds his lawful rights."
Where group action coercing outside parties is deemed an undue
restraint of trade, whatever its purpose is likely to fall and be held
illegal per se whenever used:
(a) in attempt to control distribution as in the lumber case; 0
(b) to rid a trade of price-cutters;31
(c) to discourage the development of new Social institutions.3 2
Whatever the ills a trade association and its members face, they
28. United States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 701 (S. D. N. Y.
1908).
29. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
30. The second great case on this point was Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312
U. S. 457 (1941) (style piracy case involving the boycott of those who violated the estab-
lished ethical customs of the industry).
31. United States v. Frankfort Dist., 324 U. S. 293 (1945).
32. Amercian Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1942).
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must be guided by the law. Neither existence abuse nor shady
practices and, the threat of severe economic displacement justifies
remedies and practices that transgress the law.
These all are final legal conclusions drawn from a pattern of
activities and effects.
C. Which Activities May or May Not Be Legally Pursued?
There are certain fringe areas of activities of trade associations
which have been condemned largely because they were a part of
the general pattern of activities, which were said to be a conspiracy
in a given case.
(1) Product Standardization. Where the Court found the stand-
ardization had been deliberately adopted and zealously carried on
to eliminate the only factors except price on which industry mem-
bers might compete and where practices were adopted to have uni-
form prices, the Court held in two leading cases in 1946 3 and
1949 4 that these practices should be condemned.
However, in the same year 1949 15 the court stated that if the acti-
vities of the association were otherwise legal standardization alone
would hardly infect it with illegality." The Court also founcf that
the multifarious sizes and shapes of tags bad made some standardi-
zation necessary and that there was a long history behind the de-
velopment of standard item price lists. "Standardization has been
an essential prerequisite to mass production and competition, which
has made America industrially great; yet, this is an activity which
could produce or tend to foster restrictions in trade and com-
-lerce."36
(2) Collection and Distribution of Freight Rates. Collection
and distribution of freight rates was found to be legal in 1925 for
the cement industry37 but in 194838 although the Court stated the
supplying of freight rate data "would be harmless in itself", it never-
theless proceeded to hold for the same industry it was an element
utilized with others in attaining a uniform price structure by con-
certed action and the Supreme Court upheld an enjoining action.
A later case :19 followed the lead and condemned a system em-
33. Bond Crown & C. Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1949).
34. Milk & I. C. C. Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946).
35. Tag Mfg. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949).
36. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 36 (1930);
United States v. Dried Fruit Ass'n, 4 F.R.D. 1 (1944).
37. Cement Mfg. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).
38. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
39. Triangle Conduit & C. Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by a
divided court in 3?6 U. S. 956. See also Eastern States Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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ployed by an association by having freight rates compilations made
and distributed by an individual employed for the purpose, and
stated: "These compilations became important adjuncts to petition-
crs' plans and methods in matching delivered price quotations. They
were intended by petitioners to be used as their common price
factors. We think there was direct proof of the conspiracy, but
whether there was or was not, in determining if such findings are
supported, it is not necessary that there be direct proof of an agree-
ment. Such an agreement may be shown by circumstantial evi-
dence."
However, efforts to carry this use of circumstantial evidence to
the point of requiring proof merely of consciously parallel action by
different companies was rebuffed in the lastest reported case40 in
which Justice Clark stated in his able opinion: "The crucial ques-
tion is whether respondent's conduct toward petitioner stemmed
from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.
To be sure business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence
from which the fact finder may infer agreement. But this Court
has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively
establishes agreement, or phrased differently, that such behavior
itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence
of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into
the traditional judicial attitude toward _conspiracy; but 'conscious
parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely."
(3) Filing and Distribution of Cost and Price Statistics. In the
earlier cases of filing and distribution of facts and statistics on costs,
prices, production, customers and other intimate business details
are, admittedly a highly hazardous activity for an association of
competitors to carry on and was condemned.'" However, the prac-
tice was held legal in cases later in date 42 but in each of these cases
the information collected was distributed and made available to all
interested channels of trade. Certain safeguarding principles have
emerged in connection with this statistical activity. For example, if
the price statistics collected and distributed are historical rather
40. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U. S. 537
(]954).
41. American Column &,L. Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921); Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1954); United States v. Amercian Linseed
Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
t 19 2 7 ); Eastern States Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914).
42. Maple Flooring Manufactuers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925);
Cement Mfg. Protective Ass'n v. United-States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925); Tag Mfg. Institute
v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (lst Cir. 1949).
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than current, no real danger is involved. The line of demarcation is
whether they are old enought so that they can have no direct effect
on the establishment of current or future prices. If the price list is
a month or two old before being published for the trade association
membership - such price statistics publication would be safe. In a
late case4 3 it has been indicated that rather current price informa-
tion may be collected and distributed provided that it coincides
with the historical practice in the industry and that the statistics are
published to all interested classes of trade.
The ultimate use of this price statistical information is most im-
portant. If it is used merely to give an informed background as to
the business condition of the industry in order to enable members
individually to make more intelligent independent business decis-
ions, there can be no logical objection to such activity. The Supreme
Court ably said: "Free competition means a free and open market
among both buyers and sellers for the sale and distribution of com-
modities. Competition does not become less free merely because
the conduct of commercial operations become more intelligent
through the free distribution of knowledge of all the essential fac-
tors entering into the commercial transaction. General knowledge
that there is an accumulation of surplus of any market commodity
would undoubtedly tend to diminish production, but the dissimi-
nation of that information cannot in itself be said to be restraint
upon commerce in any legal sense. It was not the purpose or intent
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law to inhibit the intelligent conduct of
business operations, nor do we conceive that its purpose was to
support such influences as might affect the operations of interstate
commerce through the application to them of the individual intelli-
gence of those engaged in commerce, enlightened by accurate in-
formation as to the essential elements of the economics of a trade
or business, however gathered or disseminated."4
(4) Multiple Activities Create a Hazard. We see that products,
standardization, collection and distribution of freight rates and the
filing and distribution of cost and price statistics may be condemned
as activities of trade associations. There are many lesser activities,
too numerous to mention here, which may be very hazardous.
Therefore, every activity must be watched which might affect the
marketing process. The reason is because the end result may be
illegal because of a combination of activities, none of which are
illegal standing alone.
43. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
44. Maple Flooring Manufacturers. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
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The Court has ably pointed this out in an opinion, 'where it was
held: "Innocent explanations are offered as to each of the circum-
stances relied on by the commission, and if it were permissible
to consider each of the circumstances out of connection with the
others, there would be much force in the argument of the petition-
ers. Where all of the circumstances are considered together as they
must be, however, there can be no question as to their sufficiency,
to support the findings and conclusions of the commission. The
standardization of product, for example, would be innocent enough
by itself, but not when taken in connection with standardization of
,discounts and differentials, publication of prices with agreements
not to charge less than a minimum under patent license agreements
affecting practically the entire industry, the freight equalization
which we have described and such uniformity of prices throughout
the industry as to leave no price competition of any sort anywhere.
The practice of freight equalization might be all right if used by
the manufacturer, individually, but not when used in connection
with standardization of product, patent control, price publication
,nd uniformity of discounts and trade practices in such a way as to
destroy price competition.""
Thus, we see that too many different innocent activities may be
combined to produce an end result that is illegal.
In some cases 6 an activity as collective merchandising of com-
petitors' product, which normally would be illegal, must be under-
taken in order to save an industry. If the court is fully informed
and wise in the scope of its concept, legal clearance will often
follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
After your trade association has been incorporated, for the pro-
tection of individual members, you should be cautious in the field of
marketing products.
Fundamentally a trade association is an artificial creature, neces-
sarily alien in its composition in the basically individualistic philo-
sophy of our anti-trust laws. Individuality should not be stifled but
cncouraged so as to avoid "legal implications of standardization."1
Any attempt to list all activities as either proper or improper
would be both improper and unrealistic. The entire pattern of all
45. Bond Crown & C. Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1949).
46. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
47. Legal Implications of Standardization, American Standard Ass'n, Sixth National
Conference on Standards, (Oct., 1955) (A fine discussion of the terminology of standardi-
zation including: quality, safety, patents, interchangeability, reduce variety, and procedures
for standardization.).
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activities of the trade association as woven into the existing eco-
nomic situation in the industry must be weighed and closely ex-
amined before any single activity, however innocent individually,
carX be approved as safe and legal for your trade association."
Certainly bureaucratic action which transgresses statutory au-
thority must be constantly watched and there is no better lookout
than our trade associations. The vast majority of American trade
associations operate in a perfectly legal manner and perform valu-
able, indispensable services for their members. The exceptions have
been cited to give a guidepost or warning of the activity zone,
which has been declared illegal. In 1955 out of 49 anti-trust cases
brought by the Federal Trade Commission only 8 involved trade
associations. Also last year of the 103- cases 49 prosecuted by the
Justice Department's Anti-Trust Division only 19 involved trade
associations, of which 10 were criminal cases.
The trend is to encourage trade associations and not to stifle
them. ° Modern industry and commerce increases public interest in
our trade associations.st The Attorney General's Conference is a
progressive approach to the problem. 5 2 There has been much help-
ful information published in trade association journals and there are
two outstanding volumes" 3 available for reference. For the average
trade association, the laws are favorable and their course can be
rursued without too much apprehension of possible illegal infringe-
ments.
Usually trade association statements regarding credits and over-
due accounts are privileged if four basic requirements are met:;"
48. Lamb and Kittrelle, Trade Association Law and Practice, (1956). See also Asso-
ciation Activities and the Law, United States Chamber of Commerce publication.
49. Many cases were against corporations directly. See United States v. E. I. Du Pont
D. N. & Co., 351 U. S. 377 (1956) (his manufacturer sold 75% of all cellophane sold in
the United States; but cellophane constituted less than 20% of all flexible packaging
materials sold in the period indicated. The Supreme Court took note of the combine; but
held "...[W]here there are marked alternatives that buyers may readily use for their
purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist merely because the product said to be monopo-
lized differs from others." The Court analyzed the principal uses of cellophane and com-
pared the extent of its use on particular products with the extent of use of alternate
wrapping materials and this convinced the Court that cellophane for the purpose of 'he
Sherman Act should not be isolated from the other packaging materials).
50. See 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1949).
51. See Fowler, Legal Activities of Trade Associations, United States Chamber of Com-
merce publication.
52. Address of Attorney General Herbert S. Brownell, Jr., Trade Ass'n Sect., United
States Chamber of Commerce meeting, May 3, 1955. See Attorney General's Committee
Report and Conference on Anti-Trust Laws, Federal Legal Publications (New York).
53. See Association Activities and the Law, United States Chamber of Commerce pub-
lication; Van Cise and Dunn, How to Comply with the Anti-Trust Laws, CCH (Spec. Rep.).
See generally monthly Ati-Trust Bulletin and Newsletter, Federal Legal Publication (New
York).
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1. Statement must be made to further legitimate interest of the
creditor;"
2. It must not be made with malice;5"
3. Or with the intention of injuring the debtor; 57
4. Or of forcing payment by coercive means.5 8
There is no basic inconsistency between the ideal of competition
embodied in the anti-trust laws and the kind of cooperation among
businessmen that is made possible by the trade associations. For
members and officers the fundamental rule to be followed in keep-
ing an association's operations within the anti-trust laws is that
there be no agreement either expressed or implied, which restrict
the individual's freedom to make independent business decisions.
54. See Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
55. Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753 (1888).
56. Locke v. Bradstreet Co., "22 Fed. 771 (D. C. Minn. 1885).
57. Mower-Hobart Co. v. Dun & Co., 131 Fed. 812 (N. D. Ga. 1904).
58. Ideal Motor Co. v. Warfield, 211 Ky. 576, 277 S.W. 862 (1925).
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